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Abstract
This paper argues that the failed attempt to introduce a mandatory board neutrality 
rule into EU takeover law was an object lesson that it is difficult to enact rules that 
are contrary to the corporate law cultures of the majority of the Member States. It 
provides an account of key factors that prevented enacting a mandatory board neu-
trality rule in the EU: varying takeover laws and practices; conflicting management 
and shareholder interests; divide between exhaustive and minimum harmonisation; 
and varying market orientation models. It argues that as long as there are varied 
national corporate laws, most EU corporate law rules are bound to remain catego-
rised as optional, unimportant, or avoidable.
Keywords Takeover directive · Takeovers · Minimum harmonisation · Board 
neutrality rule · Capital market models · Corporate law
1 Introduction
The board neutrality rule neutralises the power of the board of the offeree company 
during takeover bids by prohibiting such board from taking any action that would 
result in the frustration of the takeover bid.1 The rule, due to its controversial his-
tory, was adopted in the Takeover Directive as an optional provision. As a result of 
this optionality, a number of EU countries have sought reforms that restrict foreign 
takeovers. Such an attitude suggests that we have come to ‘the end of history’ for the 
board neutrality rule in the EU.2 A few examples of this will suffice. It was reported 
in 2014 that France ‘appropriated new powers to block foreign takeovers’,3 in 2017 
 * Jonathan Mukwiri 
 jonathan.mukwiri@durham.ac.uk
1 Durham Law School, Durham University, Durham, UK
1 See Art. 9(2) of the Takeover Directive 2004/25/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
21 April 2004 on takeover bids [2004] OJ L142/12.
2 The phrase ‘the end of history’ in the title of this paper is borrowed from an article by Hansmann and 
Kraakman (2001), p 439, which had been borrowed from a book by Fukuyama (1992).
3 Chu (2014); also reported in a BBC article: Yueh (2014).
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that Germany ‘approved a measure to make it easier for the state to veto takeovers 
of certain firms by foreign investors’,4 in 2017 that Italy passed a law to end the 
‘open approach to foreign acquisitions’,5 and in 2017 that France and the Nether-
lands sought to restrict foreign takeovers.6 This paper contextualises these attitudes 
in the context of the history of the board neutrality rule.
The history of the board neutrality rule in the regulation of EU takeovers can 
be traced back to the 1970s and is characterised by attempts to introduce into other 
Member States the corporate culture of the UK. The adoption in 2004 and the 
implementation in 2006 of an optional board neutrality rule in the Takeover Direc-
tive marked the beginning of the end of history for the board neutrality rule in the 
EU. The 2007 and 2012 reports of the European Commission and the 2013 report 
of the European Parliament suggested that the plans to revive the failed attempt to 
introduce a mandatory board neutrality rule into EU takeover law had since been 
confined to history. In drawing an object lesson from this history, this paper echoes 
the words of Luca Enriques: ‘[…] most EC corporate law rules can be categorized 
as optional, market-mimicking, unimportant, or avoidable’.7
This paper argues that the failed attempt to introduce a mandatory board neutral-
ity rule into EU takeover law is an object lesson that it is difficult to enact rules that 
are contrary to the corporate law cultures of the majority of the Member States. It 
provides an account of key factors that prevented enacting a mandatory board neu-
trality rule in the EU: varying takeover laws and practices; conflicting management 
and shareholder interests; divide between exhaustive and minimum harmonisation; 
and varying market orientation models. It argues that the optionality of the board 
neutrality rule in the Takeover Directive was caused by these key factors, and the 
varying choices made by Member States in implementing the optional board neu-
trality rule were merely the fruition. Having traced the history that sought to intro-
duce the board neutrality rule into EU takeover law, from the 1974 Commission 
report that first sought to introduce into EU law the corporate culture of the UK, 
through the 2004 Takeover Directive with its optional board neutrality rule, to the 
2007 and 2012 Commission reports and the 2013 report by the European Parliament 
on the implementation of the Takeover Directive, it concludes that as long as there 
are varied national corporate laws, most EU corporate law rules are bound to remain 
categorised as optional, unimportant, or avoidable.
The objective of this paper is to reassess, using a historical analysis, key factors 
that hindered the achieving of maximum harmonisation of regulatory intervention 
in EU takeovers. The key factors reassessed include corporate governance concepts 
such as managerial and shareholder primacy and market models, factors through 
which the paper contextualises the likely end of history for the board neutrality rule 
in the regulation of takeovers in the EU.
7 Enriques (2006), p 2.
4 Hall (2017).
5 Vagnoni (2017).
6 See ‘European takeover rules merit a sceptical response’, Financial Times, 16 June 2017.
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The paper proceeds in the following way. Section 2 provides an overview of EU 
company law harmonisation, noting that its future remains uncertain. Section  3 
examines the differing takeover laws and practices that prevailed in Member States 
in the 1970s and that led up to the adoption of the Takeover Directive, ascertaining 
what effect they had on adopting an optional as opposed to mandatory board neutral-
ity rule. Section 4 discusses the effect that company law theories had on the process 
of adopting the Takeover Directive with an optional board neutrality rule. Section 5 
addresses the legal basis of either exhaustive or minimum harmonisation measures 
with regard to the Takeover Directive—observing that while the Directive on take- 
overs had aimed at exhaustive harmonisation, the legal basis of the Takeover Direc-
tive in Article 50 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) 
(ex Article 44 TEC) did not envisage exhaustive harmonisation. It also examines 
how the manner in which some Member States implement the optional board neu-
trality rule destroyed any glimmer of hope to achieve exhaustive harmonisation of 
takeover laws in the EU—observing the correlation between market orientation 
models and Member States’ choices. Section 6 considers the question: what can the 
Commission do to achieve exhaustive harmonisation? The last section makes con-
cluding remarks.
2  Overview of EU Company Law Harmonisation
The current EU legislative framework for company law is based on minimum har-
monisation, having failed to achieve full harmonisation due to diverse national com-
pany laws. Giving a few examples of minimum harmonised EU company laws will 
suffice. The Tenth Company Law Directive (2005/56/EC) harmonised the basic 
requirements on the procedures of cross-border mergers of limited liability compa-
nies. The Eleventh Company Law Directive (89/666/EEC, as amended by Directive 
2012/17/EU on registers of companies) harmonised basic disclosure requirements 
for EU companies setting up branches in other Member States and in non-EU coun-
tries. The Twelfth Company Law Directive (2009/102/EC) harmonised the basic 
requirements for forming a single-member private limited liability company. The 
‘Thirteenth Company Law Directive’, as it was first termed, and later known as the 
Takeover Directive (2004/25/EC), harmonised the basic requirements for the con-
duct of takeovers in the EU. Directive 2017/1132/EU simply consolidates six previ-
ous Directives (Directive 82/891/ECC; Directive 89/666/ECC; Directive 2005/56/
EC; Directive 2009/101/EC; Directive 2011/35/EC; and Directive 2012/30/EU) into 
a single text for accessibility and certainty.
This minimum harmonisation framework is not a result of legislative choice, but 
of failing to harmonise multiple and divergent national rules in the EU. The view 
taken in this paper is that, ‘in essence, harmonization involves replacing the multiple 
and divergent national rules on a particular subject with a single EU rule’.8 After 
decades of striving for but never achieving full harmonisation, EU legislators have 
8 Barnard (2010), p 624.
256 J. Mukwiri 
123
settled for minimum harmonisation in EU company law, characterised by giving 
‘choice’ to Member States through optionality provisions to accommodate divergent 
national rules. Optionality has tended to entrench diverse national rules. For exam-
ple, the Fourth and Seventh Directives, governing accounting, included so many 
options that they allowed the Member States to largely leave their own accounting 
cultures as they were.9 This is most evident in takeover law.
EU company law harmonisation efforts in the 1990s sought to create a level play-
ing field, making company law rules equivalent throughout the EU. A level play-
ing field was hard to achieve given the divergent national company laws in the EU. 
Member States were often unable to agree. As a result, the early efforts of seeking 
to fully ‘harmonise company law was stalled by the need to reconcile fundamental 
differences in approaches to corporate governance’.10 These same differences stalled 
the adoption of the Takeover Directive for over 30 years until the core provisions 
(Articles 9 and 11) were made optional in the final text of the Takeover Directive. 
By 2003, the EU approach to harmonisation had changed from focusing on a level 
playing field to concentrating on competitiveness of business. Interestingly, the 
Commission was of the view that ‘some company law rules are likely to be best 
dealt with, and updated, more efficiently at national level, and some competition 
between national rules may actually be healthy for the efficiency of the single mar-
ket’.11 Rather than aim at creating a level playing field, EU legislators have to assess 
the impact of company law measures on business. It is argued here that the change 
of approach was a result of failure to harmonise divergent national rules, coupled 
with EU interests giving way to national interests.
The legal basis for harmonisation of EU company law is contained in Article 
50(2)(g) TFEU. This Article requires EU institutions, acting by means of directives, 
to particularly attain freedom of establishment ‘by coordinating to the necessary 
extent the safeguards which, for the protection of the interests of members and oth-
ers, are required by Member States of companies or firms […] with a view to mak-
ing such safeguards equivalent throughout the Union’. This harmonisation objective 
is most seen in EU takeover law. Whereas takeovers belong to securities regulation 
in most Member States, the EU deals with takeovers under company law.12 The 
popular view is that ‘takeover law falls in between company law and corporation 
law, as demonstrated by the original term that is no longer technically correct: the 
Thirteenth Company Law Directive’.13 This overview of company law harmonisa-
tion treats takeovers as part of EU company law.
Harmonisation of takeover laws is vital in providing an efficient EU market for 
corporate control and facilitating corporate restructuring. The EU law regulating 
11 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Par-
liament: Modernising company law and enhancing corporate governance in the European Union—A plan 
to move forward, 21 May 2003, COM(2003) 284, para. 2.2.
12 Mukwiri (2013a), p 832; Wymeersch (2004), p 150.
13 Hopt (2014), p 159; see also Wymeersch (2004), p 150.
9 Gelter (2017).
10 Armour and Ring (2011), p 129.
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takeovers is contained in the Takeover Directive.14 Prior to the Takeover Directive, 
there were different corporate governance patterns across the EU with numerous and 
far-reaching barriers to takeover bids that were lawful and applied in various Mem-
ber States.15 This created a lack of level playing field in the EU market for corpo-
rate control. It required harmonisation, which ‘in essence, […] involves replacing 
the multiple and divergent national rules on a particular subject with a single EU 
rule’.16 Harmonisation was an objective of the Takeover Directive, which was stated 
in terms of making ‘safeguards equivalent throughout the Community’,17 and these 
safeguards would ‘prevent patterns of corporate restructuring within the Commu-
nity from being distorted by arbitrary differences in governance and management 
cultures’.18
The Commission had intended to achieve maximum harmonisation by removing 
barriers to takeover bids through the UK model of the board neutrality rule during 
takeovers. After 30 years of political unwillingness to agree on the board neutrality 
rule,19 the Takeover Directive was watered down to minimum harmonisation. The 
problem with this minimum harmonisation Takeover Directive was that it permitted 
corporate structures and defensive measures that were liable to frustrate takeover 
bids and create obstacles to free movement of capital. That the Commission con-
ceded to such a takeover law regime signalled to Member States that the Commis-
sion was becoming weak and unlikely to call for radical future takeover law reforms. 
Agreeing to the optional board neutrality rule in adopting the Takeover Directive 
paved the way for the demise of exhaustive harmonisation of EU takeover laws. It 
also entrenched the lack of political will and national economic interests. Achieve-
ment of exhaustive harmonisation in EU takeovers is unlikely in the near future, as 
recent reports suggest that the Commission has put reforming EU takeover law on 
hold.
Four basic reasons for harmonisation of national rules were identified in the Opin-
ion of AG Trstenjak of 2 June 2010 in Idrima Tipou v. Ipourgos Tipou.20 First, facil-
itation of freedom of establishment: specifically ‘[…] in the case of companies, they 
can and will in fact exercise their right of establishment only if there is a harmonised 
legal environment’. Second, ‘a further impetus for legal harmonisation is the realisa-
tion that decisions on location should be taken in the interest of the European Union 
economy as a whole’. Third, ‘the approximation of national legal orders is intended 
to ensure that competitive conditions are as equal as possible for undertakings in 
14 Directive 2004/25/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on takeover 
bids [2004] OJ L142/12.
15 For a list of takeover barriers in Member States prior to the Takeover Directive, see Winter (2002), 
Annex 4.
16 Barnard (2010), p 624.
17 Recital 1, Takeover Directive (emphasis added).
18 Recital 3, Takeover Directive.
19 The ‘board neutrality rule’ is contained in Art. 9 of the Takeover Directive, which prohibits boards 
from taking any action to frustrate a takeover bid without shareholders’ approval.
20 Case C-81/09 Idrima Tipou AE v. Ipourgos Tipou Kai Meson Mazikis Enimerosis, judgment of 21 
October 2010, ECLI:EU:C:2010:622, para. 30.
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the European Union’. Fourth, ‘the existence of comparable legal environments helps 
to ensure that cross-border investments by undertakings and members are made for 
the benefit of economic and social development in the European Union’. These four 
basic reasons for company law harmonisation align well with the early EU approach 
of seeking to create a level playing field. However, due to the national differences 
that could not be reconciled or removed, EU company law harmonisation has been 
reduced to minimum harmonisation characterised by optional provisions. One such 
example is the adoption of the Takeover Directive. The optionality in core provi-
sions was not a matter of choice on the part of the Commission, but rather a com-
promise. The EU legislators had no ‘choice’ but to give ‘choice’ to Member States. 
Thus, EU interests gave way to national interests.
3  Harmonising Against Varying Takeover Laws and Practices
3.1  Diverse EU Takeover Laws and Practices
Prior to the adoption of the Takeover Directive, there prevailed different takeover 
laws and practices in the EU. These differing prior laws and practices had a pro-
found effect on the choices some Member States made, especially with regard to 
the optional board neutrality rule. In the 1970s, before the proposal for a Takeover 
Directive, in different Member States, takeovers of listed companies were regulated 
by law, or by Codes having no force of law, or there were no comparable laws and 
practices.21 For example, at that time, in Italy and the Netherlands, takeovers were 
regulated by Codes that had no force of law, save that they were enforced by profes-
sional sanction. In France, Belgium and Luxembourg, takeovers were regulated by 
law. In the UK, they were partly regulated by law but mainly by the City Code on 
Takeovers and Mergers that had no force of law save that it was enforced by profes-
sional sanction. In Germany, Denmark and Ireland, there were no comparable laws 
or Codes regulating takeovers.
In Germany, in the 1970s, there were no clear laws or practices regulating take- 
overs of listed companies. Until the mid-1990s, public takeover bids did not play an 
important role in Germany.22 A voluntary Takeover Code (Übernahmekodex) was 
introduced in 1995, but proved to be ineffective.23 It did not provide for any sanc-
tions, and not all companies signed a voluntary declaration of adherence.24 As pub-
lic takeovers increased, there were calls within Germany to replace the voluntary 
Takeover Code by a mandatory German Takeover Act.25 It was ‘all change’ after the 
2000 successful hostile takeover of Mannesmann (a German company) by Vodafone 
Airtouch Plc (a UK company). The legislator felt that the level of investor protection 
25 Weber (2000), p 51; Weber and Schimmelschmidt (2000), p 264.
21 European Commission, ‘Report on Takeover Offers and Other Offers’ (1974, Document XI/56/74).
22 Elst and Steen (2007), pp 213–242.
23 Vitols (2005), p 390.
24 Lohner and Schumann (2014), p 5.
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provided by the Takeover Code was insufficient and introduced the Takeover Act.26 
The Takeover Act was drafted in 2000 and enacted in 2002.
The takeover landscape in Germany averts hostile takeovers. Daniel Komo and 
Charlotte Villiers summarise the takeover landscape in Germany,27 observing that, 
unlike in the UK, takeovers in Germany have quite a short tradition. The traditional 
structure of the German economy, ‘Deutschland AG’ or ‘Germany Incorporated’, 
is characterised by banks that hold large shares in major German companies and 
are traditionally not willing to sell to hostile bidders. The powerful employees’ 
and trade unions’ representatives on supervisory boards deter hostile bidders. In 
1991, Deutschland AG averted the takeover of Continental by Pirelli. But in 2000 
Deutschland AG finally gave way to a takeover when Vodafone took over Mannes-
mann. Fearing that other German companies could also be taken over by hostile bid-
ders, ‘Germany withdrew its political support for the European Union’s proposal 
for a 13th Directive on takeover bids. At the end of 2000, German delegates in the 
European Parliament made their own proposal for a directive including the right of 
the target board to frustrate bids and employee protection at the change of manage-
ment.’28 Fast forward to 2004, the Takeover Directive was adopted with optional 
provisions for Member States, allowing them to opt out of the rule against target 
boards taking actions that may frustrate bids; Germany opted out.
In the Netherlands, ‘for a long time, the supervision of the conduct of public 
offers was done on the basis of self-regulatory rules with an oversight by a non-
statutory regulator’.29 It was not until 2001 that the non-statutory Code was trans-
formed into statute law, under a statutory regulator. The corporate landscape in the 
Netherlands is characterised by administrative offices owning large voting blocks in 
Dutch companies. These large blocks, controlled by administrative offices, ‘are used 
widely by Dutch corporations as anti-takeover devices; their prevalence presumably 
explains the absence of hostile takeovers in the Netherlands’.30 It was for the pro-
tection of Dutch companies that the Netherlands did not favour the board neutral-
ity rule in the proposed Takeover Directive. The Netherlands opposed the EU pro-
posal for a Takeover Directive, fearing that its companies would be subject to hostile 
takeovers.31
The stance against hostile takeovers in the Netherlands is not confined to his-
tory and shows no signs of relenting. In July 2017, the newspapers reported that the 
Dutch economic affairs minister was pursuing economic protectionism in propos-
ing measures to block foreign hostile takeovers and hindering the ability of foreign 
companies to pursue takeover bids in the country.32 The renewed stance against hos-
tile takeovers came in the wake of two Dutch companies, Akzo Nobel and Unilever, 
26 Lohner and Schumann (2014), p 5.
27 Komo and Villiers (2009), pp 195–197.
28 Komo and Villiers (2009), p 195.
29 Brauw et al. (2008), p 312.
30 Jong et al. (2002), p 205.
31 Hopt (2002), p 9.
32 Marriage (2017).
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resisting takeover attempts by US companies. It was in 2012 that the European Par-
liament, discussing ways of strengthening the single market, condemned economic 
protectionism, expressing ‘its concern that the re-emergence of economic protec-
tionism at national level would most probably result in fragmentation of the inter-
nal market and a reduction in competitiveness, and therefore needs to be avoided’.33 
This was 5 years ago, yet the Netherlands proposes economic protectionism—this 
suggests that EU takeovers are likely to return to diverse laws underpinned by 
national protectionism.
In the UK, the conduct of takeover bids in public companies has, since 1968, 
been regulated under the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers and supervised by 
the Panel on Takeovers and Mergers.34 Hostile takeovers in the UK are said to be 
traceable back to the 1950s.35 Historically, as observed by Armour and Skeel, in 
London, City professionals—in particular, institutional investors—avoided the need 
for ex post litigation by developing a body of norms, which eventually gave rise to 
the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers. These norms were enforced by reputa-
tional sanctions, such as the threat of exclusion from the London Stock Exchange, 
which ensured that contentious issues were resolved ex ante without the need for 
court involvement. Armour and Skeel rightly observe that, as such, the histori-
cal UK’s self-regulatory system was driven by the preponderance of institutional 
investors in the marketplace and a regulatory framework that trusted them to gov-
ern themselves.36 In the UK, the system that prevailed in 1970s, a period when the 
Commission began to consider an EU law on takeovers, was that of self-regulation, 
and the operation of the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers, and of the Panel, 
was without force of law until 2006 when the UK implemented the EU Takeover 
Directive.
3.2  Model of UK Takeover Law and Practice
With such a diverse spectrum of laws and practices, or lack thereof, prevailing 
across the EU in the 1970s, adopting a harmonised directive on takeover laws was 
bound to be difficult. Where the EU’s and individual Member States’ interests often 
conflict, it was difficult to have harmonised laws that would appeal to all Member 
States. Nonetheless, ‘the Takeover Directive aims at harmonization on the EU level 
of the law and practice of the Member States in relation to public offers to take over 
companies’.37 As early as 1974, the European Commission, through the then special 
adviser to the EEC, Professor Robert Pennington, set out to examine the various 
33 European Parliament, ‘Delivering a single market to consumers and citizens’ [2011] OJ C 161E, p 84, 
para. 6; European Parliament, ‘Financial, economic and social crisis: Recommendations concerning the 
measures and initiatives to be taken (mid-term report)’ [2012] OJ C 70E, p 19, para. 127; and European 
Parliament, ‘Governance and partnership in the single market’ [2012] OJ C 296E, p 51, para. 21.
34 Mukwiri (2009), p 5.
35 Armour and Skeel (2007), p 1727.
36 Armour and Skeel (2007), p 1731.
37 Bernitz (2010), p 192.
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laws and practices of Member States in relation to takeovers in the EU with a view 
to proposing steps for their harmonisation.38 Regarding the various laws and prac-
tices of Member States examined in the 1974 Pennington report, it was concluded 
that ‘British law and practice is undoubtedly the most developed in this field because 
of the longer experience of takeover and other bids in the United Kingdom’.39 Based 
on that conclusion, the Commission set out to model the Directive on the UK’s City 
Code on Takeovers and Mergers, and to introduce the board neutrality rule into EU 
law.40 The literature provides an account of the difficulties the Commission encoun-
tered in the process of adopting the Takeover Directive.41
The task of harmonising divergent laws and practices of Member States was not 
made easier by the aim of introducing a mandatory board neutrality rule, modelled 
on the UK’s City Code, into the Takeover Directive. One problem observed in the 
literature was that the draft Directive was highly ambitious, its aim being to intro-
duce into some Member States the corporate culture of the UK, and that therein lay 
the problem.42
But the introduction of a board neutrality rule modelled on the UK’s City Code 
was not arbitrary. In 1974, Professor Robert Pennington recommended a mandatory 
board neutrality rule, stating that ‘the directors of the offeree company and collabo-
rators with it shall not do any act or enter any transaction which is likely to frus-
trate a general bid or an intended general bid of which they are aware unless the act 
or transaction has previously been expressly approved by a general meeting of the 
offeree company’.43 In 2002, a High Level Group of Company Law Experts, led by 
Professor Jaap Winter, recommended a mandatory board neutrality rule, stating that 
‘the board should not be able to frustrate or block a takeover bid and thereby deprive 
shareholders of the opportunity to tender in such a bid’.44 Despite the adviser and 
experts recommending a mandatory board neutrality rule, the Commission failed to 
convince all Member States, and the rule was made optional in the final Directive.
4  Harmonising Against Conflicting Management and Shareholder 
Interests
4.1  Who Should Decide on Unwanted Takeover Bids?
The question regarding the board neutrality rule is: who should decide on whether 
to take defensive action against unwanted takeover bids: managers or shareholders? 
43 European Commission, Document XI/56/74, p 2, para. 2(d).
44 European Commission, ‘Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts on Issues Related 
to Takeover Bids’, Brussels, 10 January 2002, p 20.
38 European Commission, ‘Report on Takeover Offers and Other Offers’ (1974, Document XI/56/74).
39 European Commission, Document XI/56/74, p 8, para. 12.
40 For a critical evaluation of the board neutrality rule contained in the UK’s City Code, see Kershaw 
(2016).
41 See Mukwiri (2009), pp 9–10.
42 O’Neill (2000), p 175.
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The simple answer to this question lies in the ownership of shares, i.e. the things 
subject to a takeover. In English law, ‘the shares or other interest of a member in a 
company are personal property’.45 Ordinarily, as personal property, shares are owned 
by shareholders, who have the right to sell and therefore should decide on defences 
frustrating the sale of shares. A takeover is a transaction between the bidder (legal 
or natural person) and the shareholders of the company for the purchase of shares in 
the company. The takeover involves a change of identity of the holders of the shares 
in the company, leaving the company intact. As it leaves the company’s legal sta-
tus unaffected, takeovers should not be the concern of company managers, and the 
decision to frustrate a takeover should be left to the share owners. In the course of 
the company’s ordinary business activities, decision-making lies with the board. As 
takeovers are about selling shares and not about selling the company, the owners of 
those shares should decide whether to tender or reject an offer for their shares. Thus, 
in the UK, the board neutrality rule seeks to ensure that the board does not interfere 
with property rights of share owners.
However, the simple answer did not help in introducing a mandatory board neu-
trality rule, or in preventing the end of history for the board neutrality rule, in the 
EU. This simple answer based on share ownership was or is not accepted because 
the narrow question which the board neutrality rule answers is often confused with 
the broader question as answered by corporate governance theories. The debate on 
the board neutrality rule often confuses the broader question of whose interest the 
company should manage (thus the shareholder primacy theory versus the stake-
holder theory of corporate governance—or both shareholder and stakeholder theo-
ries versus an entity maximisation model46) with the narrow question of who should 
decide whether or not to tender shares to a takeover bidder (thus share owners versus 
the board of the offeree company). Accepting that takeovers are about share owners 
selling their personal property, the board neutrality rule answers the narrow ques-
tion. But it is worth examining two broad views on the board neutrality rule.
4.2  Shareholders Deciding on Takeover Defences
The first broad view favours shareholders deciding on defensive measures. This 
is the view taken by Easterbrook and Fischel.47 They argue that market prices for 
shares reflect the value of the company assets as deployed by the incumbent man-
agers. They argue that the fact ‘that the bid occurs at a premium over the market 
price indicates that revamping the target’s structure or management would generate 
private and, in all likelihood, social gains’. Easterbrook and Fischel argue that mana-
gerial defensive measures ‘frustrate the achievement of these gains’. ‘Consequently 
managers should remain passive and let investors decide whether to tender’. Hav-
ing made the argument that, ‘if takeovers are beneficial to both shareholders and 
society, any strategy designed to prevent tender offers reduces welfare’, Easterbrook 
45 Companies Act 2006, s. 541.
46 See Keay (2008), pp 663–698; Mukwiri (2013b), pp 217–241.
47 Easterbrook and Fischel (1991), pp 171–174.
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and Fischel reach this ‘Conclusion: Managers should leave to shareholders and rival 
bidders the task of “responding” to offers’. Easterbrook and Fischel make convinc-
ing economic arguments in favour of shareholders taking the decision on whether to 
accept an offer from bidders.
Henry Manne takes the view that it is for shareholders, not managers, to decide 
on whether to tender their shares.48 Shareholders, in takeover situations, Manne 
argues, have ‘both power and protection commensurate with their interest in cor-
porate affairs’ and ‘the power to sell their votes at a premium’. Manne states that a 
fundamental premise of takeovers is that the share index measures the efficiency of 
management—the essence of the argument is this: the lower the share price index, 
relative to what it could be with more efficient management, the more attractive the 
takeover becomes to bidders who believe that they can manage the company more 
efficiently. Manne argues that, given that courts are loath to second-guess manag-
ers’ decisions or remove them from office, ‘only the take-over scheme provides 
some assurance of competitive efficiency among corporate managers and thereby 
affords strong protection to the interests of vast numbers of small, non-controlling 
shareholders’.
The abovementioned first view would favour a mandatory board neutrality rule 
for EU takeovers. It was the preferred option for the Commission in the run-up 
to the adoption of the Takeover Directive, but it was made optional due to lack of 
agreement between Member States. In its 2007 report, the Commission assessed the 
effect of an optional board neutrality rule and concluded that anti-takeover devices 
make takeovers more difficult or costly and consequently entrench management and 
render companies immune to unfriendly raiders.49
4.3  Management Deciding on Takeover Defences
The second view favours managers deciding on defensive measures. A fundamental 
premise of this view is that corporations exist to create wealth for society. Marga-
ret Blair gives a few points in support of this view.50 Blair observes that the idea 
of socially responsible companies was popular from the 1960s to the early 1980s, 
with social activists being in support of policies giving managers more defences 
against takeovers. Blair argues that the idea of corporations having a social purpose 
beyond maximising shareholder return survives—it is for managers to maximise the 
total wealth of the enterprise, to consider the effect their decisions have on all of the 
company’s stakeholders. Employees, Blair argues, make firm-specific investments 
by way of human capital, which should be protected by managers. A firm’s employ-
ees are much more likely to be motivated to find new ways to innovate or to cut 
costs if they are confident that they will share in the wealth created and that share-
holders will not expropriate such wealth from them. Blair’s basic argument is that 
50 Blair (1995), pp 202, 262–277.
48 Manne (1965), pp 112–113, 117.
49 European Commission, ‘Report on the implementation of the Directive on Takeover Bids’ (Brussels, 
21 February 2007), SEC(2007) 268, para. 2.
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decision-making, even in takeovers, should be deferred to managers, who are better 
placed to protect all stakeholders.
In support of managers deciding on defensive measures, Shleifer and Summers 
examine the effect of hostile takeovers (takeovers that are not recommended by 
managers). They argue that hostile takeovers facilitate opportunistic behaviour at 
the expense of stakeholders,51 and that takeovers which limit managers’ ability to 
take defensive measures have the effect of redistributing wealth from stakeholders 
to shareholders instead of creating wealth. Shleifer and Summers’ basic argument is 
that, because hostile takeovers breach trust between the company and stakeholders, 
managers should be able to take defensive measures to protect stakeholders—their 
argument runs as follows: by implicit contracts, employees invest human capital, 
doing the job well, trusting that their productivity will be rewarded by the loyalty 
of managers; a hostile bidder who is not committed to upholding those implicit con-
tracts comes along, removes managers, and then expropriates rents from stakehold-
ers; when hostile acquirers cut jobs, takeover premia are gained at the expense of 
stakeholders.
4.4  Effect of Shareholder Versus Management Decision‑Making
The above overview reveals a conflict between management and shareholder inter-
ests: ‘a conflict between the directors and their interest to perpetuate their presence 
in their office and the shareholders and their interest to maximise their wealth’.52 It 
also reveals that exhaustive harmonisation regarding takeover defences was bound to 
fail considering the varying views. The abovementioned different views show how 
challenging it can be to answer the seemingly narrow question of who should decide 
on defensive measures. On the one hand, shareholders should decide; after all, they 
own the shares. But takeovers may well have the effect of shareholders exploiting 
other stakeholders who have contributed to the corporation’s wealth, especially 
if jobs are cut and factories are closed after a takeover. It may sound plausible to 
take the view that managers should have the ability to protect long-term interests of 
the company and resist short-term interests of shareholders willing to tender their 
shares. But on closer scrutiny, ‘it is, however, rather a different thing to justify pre-
cluding the shareholders from selling their stock at a large immediate profit on the 
ground that in the long run that will be good for them. While one might of course 
say that, many people would find it disturbing to put such a result on the basis that 
directors know what is better for shareholder than they themselves do.’53
Besides the foregoing, there is contentious debate on whether takeovers play a 
disciplining role. Alfred Rappaport argues that takeovers have changed the atti-
tudes and practices of managers, as they represent the most effective check on 
management autonomy ever devised.54 Easterbrook and Fischel state that hostile 
51 Shleifer and Summers (1998), pp 34–42.
52 Barboutis (1999), p 14.
53 Allen (1992), p 275.
54 Rappaport (1990), p 96.
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takeovers are responses to the failures of managers to seize business or profitable 
merger opportunities; and that managers must attempt to improve the firm’s per-
formance, which leads to higher share prices and reduced chances of takeovers.55 
In their study, Franks and Mayer, using different benchmarks, found little evidence 
that hostile takeovers are motivated by poor performance prior to bids, and hence 
they rejected the view that hostile takeovers perform a disciplinary role.56 Armour 
and Skeel argue that a key mechanism for rendering managers accountable to share-
holders is the market for corporate control: namely, by posing the threat that if the 
managers fail to maximise the share price, the company may become an acquisition 
target.57 Andrew Johnson states that the constant threat of takeover has a positive 
effect on share prices generally, as the markets reflect this constraint on managerial 
discretion and because, under threat of takeover, incumbent management tends to 
behave in a manner remarkably similar to successful bidders.58
It is argued here that the above company law theories had a profound effect on the 
process of adopting the Takeover Directive with an optional board neutrality rule. 
In the process of adopting the Directive on takeovers, regarding the question of who 
should decide on defensive measures, an argument in favour of employees’ rights 
during takeovers was presented to the Commission. The Commission rejected a pro-
posed amendment to include in the Takeover Directive a provision that employees 
should have a voice in the decision-making on bids. According to the Commission, 
employees ‘have no place in these provisions […] only the holders of securities can 
decide whether or not to sell them and they are therefore the only parties concerned 
by it’.59 Similar arguments were considered and rejected by the High Level Group 
of Company Law Experts. In particular, the experts considered the argument that 
allowing managers to decide on defensive measures alleviates shareholders’ pres-
sure to tender and protects employees. The experts argued that these managerial 
‘claims to represent the interests of shareholders or other stakeholders are likely to 
be tainted by self-interest’.60
It was against this spectrum of divided opinions on the question of who should 
decide on taking defensive measures that a provision in favour of shareholders was 
inserted in the Takeover Directive. Article 9 of the Takeover Directive is based on 
the recommendation of company law experts that the ultimate decision on whether 
to tender shares and at what price must rest with the shareholders. This is the cor-
nerstone for the market of corporate control involving takeovers, for ‘a market for 
corporate control cannot operate where company law allows management to take 
defensive action which delays or prevents prospective takeovers’.61 To the extent 
that a single EU board neutrality rule does not affect the allocation of managerial 
55 Easterbrook and Fischel (1991), p 173.
56 Franks and Mayer (1996), p 163.
57 Armour and Skeel (2007), p 1727.
58 Johnston (2007), p 422.
59 European Commission, COM(2001) 77 final, p 5, para. 3.1.4.
60 Winter (2002), p 21.
61 Johnston (2007), p 450.
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decision-making power in the course of the company’s ordinary business activi-
ties, the strict board neutrality rule as proposed by the EU was justified.62 Moreover, 
‘from a supranational perspective, takeover regimes which permit defensive meas-
ures and pre-bid structures that depart from proportionality are obstacles to free 
movement of capital because they distort patterns of cross-border investment from 
what they would be in the absence of those rules’.63 Issues of ‘proportionality’ apart, 
in theory, it is for shareholders to decide whether to tender or reject an offer; in prac-
tice, given that the board neutrality rule remains optional, the board may decide on 
defensive measures.
5  Harmonising Against EU Harmonisation and Market Orientation 
Models
5.1  EU Harmonisation Models: Minimum Versus Exhaustive Harmonisation
So far, the discussion in this paper has examined normative issues affecting the 
choice regarding the nature of a board neutrality rule. There are also prescrip-
tive EU law issues that may have affected the adoption of harmonised EU take- 
over laws. Legal harmonisation is vital in order to prevent individual Member States 
from using their legal systems to erect or maintain barriers to market access with 
a view to protecting their own enterprises from takeovers.64 As regards EU take- 
overs, exhaustive harmonisation is preferable to minimum harmonisation, for oth-
erwise it is difficult to achieve effective harmonisation in the EU. The difference 
between exhaustive and minimum harmonisation is explained by the setting of EU 
rules beyond which national rules cannot surpass or below which national rules can-
not fall. Thus, ‘the distinctive feature of fully harmonising secondary legislation is 
that the Member States may neither surpass nor fall short of the relevant stipulations 
of Community law’.65 Harmonisation ‘remains a sensitive matter both legally and 
politically’, which perhaps explains why ‘the EU has experimented with different 
types of harmonization measures—exhaustive, optional, partial, minimum, [and] 
reflexive’.66
In the context of this paper, exhaustive harmonisation is where diverse national 
rules are replaced by uniform mandatory EU rules, and minimum harmonisation is 
where there is a mixture of EU rules set at a threshold below which national law 
cannot fall and EU rules that Member States are free to opt into or opt out of. One 
of the stated objectives of the Takeover Directive is: ‘Reinforcing the single market, 
62 Hertig and McCahery (2003), p 199.
63 Johnson (2010), p 164.
64 Hopt (2002), p 8.
65 Case C-160/08 European Commission v. Federal Republic of Germany, ECLI:EU:C:2010:230—
Opinion of Advocate General Trstenjak delivered on 11 February 2010, ECLI:EU:C:2010:67, para. 107.
66 Barnard (2010), p 624.
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by enabling free movement of capital throughout the EU.’67 As vehicles of capi-
tal, takeovers are at the heart of the single market. Minimum harmonisation is not 
appropriate for areas that are at the heart of the single market.68 Exhaustive harmo-
nisation of the Takeover Directive failed when core provisions were made optional. 
These optional provisions of the Takeover Directive do not maximise the reinforce-
ment of the single market and do not enable free movement of capital throughout the 
EU.
Arguably, the Directive aimed at exhaustive harmonisation, yet its legal basis in 
Article 50 of TFEU (ex Article 44 TEC) did not envisage even minimum harmoni-
sation. The preamble to the Takeover Directive states: ‘Having regard to the Treaty 
establishing the European Community, and in particular Article 44(1) thereof.’ In 
other words, having regard to freedom of establishment, which is what Article 50(1) 
of TFEU (ex Article 44(1) TEC) is all about. Then, the first recital of the Takeover 
Directive refers to Article 44(2)(g) TEC (Article 50(2)(g)) as its legal basis: ‘[…] to 
coordinate certain safeguards […] with a view to making such safeguards equiva-
lent throughout the Community’. In the Treaty, paragraph (g) refers to ‘coordinating 
to the necessary extent the safeguards’. It has been argued that Article 50(2)(g) (ex 
Article 44(2)(g) ‘offers a legal basis for measures aiming at co-ordination “to the 
necessary extent” but no legal basis for approximation (harmonization) of laws’.69 
While Article 50(2)(g) may not provide a legal basis for harmonisation, it is argued 
that the Commission aimed at exhaustive harmonisation.
Two seemingly conflicting views are embedded in the Takeover Directive. First, 
there is the view that the scope of the Directive is limited to the ‘co-ordination’ of 
laws and does not extend to their harmonisation. This view is derived from Article 
1(1) of the Takeover Directive, which states: ‘This Directive lays down measures 
coordinating the laws […] of Member States […] relating to takeover bids for the 
securities of companies governed by the laws of Member States’. In Periscopus AS 
v. Oslo Bors ASA and Erik Must AS,70 it was, convincingly, submitted by the Nor-
wegian Government that ‘according to Article 1(1), the Directive provides for the 
coordination, not the harmonisation, of national laws relating to takeover bids’. Sec-
ond, there is the view that the Directive envisioned ‘harmonisation’ of laws. It is a 
view read in Recital 29 of the Takeover Directive, which mandates the Commis-
sion to ‘facilitate movement towards the fair and balanced harmonisation of rules 
on takeovers in the European Union’. This view can also be found in Article 19, 
which provides for setting up a contact committee with the function ‘to facilitate, 
without prejudice to Articles 226 and 227 of the Treaty, the harmonised application 
of this Directive through regular meetings dealing with practical problems arising in 
connection with its application’. It is suggested here that the seemingly conflicting 
67 European Commission, Application of Directive 2004/25/EC on takeover bids, COM(2012) 347 final 
(Brussels, 28 June 2012), para. 1.3.
68 Dougan (2000), p 860.
69 Bernitz (2010), p 191.
70 Case E-1/10 [2010] EFTA.
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views are a result of the mismatch between what the Commission originally set out 
to do and what it achieved by way of compromise.
Notwithstanding the doubt cast on the legal basis in Article 50(2)(g), the Com-
mission stated that the aim of the Directive was ‘to harmonise national rules on 
takeover bids’.71 That the Commission aimed at exhaustive harmonisation is evi-
dent from the first recital of the Takeover Directive. Arguably, only by exhaustive 
harmonisation could those safeguards (see Recital 1 of the Takeover Directive) be 
made ‘equivalent throughout’ the EU. It seems that the Commission was careful in 
the choice of wording of Article 50(2)(g) in the first recital, but the actual Treaty 
wording refers to ‘coordinating to the necessary extent’, which some have argued 
envisages only a minimum level of protection throughout the EU.72 Exhaustive har-
monisation is also evident in the third recital of the Takeover Directive, which seeks 
‘to prevent patterns of corporate restructuring within the Community from being 
distorted by arbitrary differences in governance and management cultures’. It is diffi-
cult to see how ‘arbitrary differences in governance and management cultures’ in the 
diverse laws and practices of Member States can be prevented from distorting ‘cor-
porate restructuring’ other than by exhaustive harmonisation of EU takeover laws. 
But while the Commission had aimed at exhaustive harmonisation, the Takeover 
Directive was adopted as a minimum harmonisation instrument.
The problem with minimum harmonisation, particularly as it makes the board 
neutrality rule optional, is that it does not create a level playing field for takeovers 
and therefore fails to facilitate free movement of capital across the EU. Moreover, 
such an ‘optionality device ends up setting forth (or, better, tolerating) a Babel-like 
system for takeover defences around the various national legislations’.73 Optionality 
led to the demise of exhaustive harmonisation.
The final version of the Takeover Directive left the contentious areas, one of 
which being Article 9 (board neutrality rule), optional for Member States. As is 
well known, the Commission succeeded in adopting the final version of the Take- 
over Directive only after the Council and the European Parliament had agreed not to 
harmonise target companies’ defensive tactics, the only politically hot issue in the 
Directive proposal and one that had led to the European Parliament’s rejection of 
the earlier proposal.74 Given that a mandatory board neutrality rule was not compat-
ible with corporate structures in the majority of EU states, the agreement between 
the Commission, Council and Parliament, to abandon enacting a mandatory board 
neutrality rule, provides an object lesson that it is difficult to enact rules that are 
contrary to the corporate law cultures of the majority of the Member States. Given 
its optional provisions and the manner in which it was implemented, the Take- 
over Directive resorted to ‘minimal harmonization’ of takeover procedures.75 This 
new position of minimum harmonisation that gives choice to Member States was 
71 European Commission, COM(2001) 77 final, p 5, para. 3.1.4.
72 For reference to this discussion see Wolff (1993), p 21.
73 Gatti (2005), p 567.
74 Enriques (2006), p 24.
75 Elst et al. (2007), p 22; Elst and Steen (2007), p 215.
269The End of History for the Board Neutrality Rule in the EU 
123
a natural result of the original aim of exhaustive harmonisation having been frus-
trated by disagreements and compromises. ‘Not surprisingly, legislators have tended 
to introduce choice for Member States or private parties when they have found it dif-
ficult to make headway with resolving a conflict.’76 Commenting on the final version 
of the Takeover Directive, the then Chairman of the UK’s Takeover Panel stated that 
the Takeover Directive was ‘hardly a triumph for harmonisation since the conten-
tious areas remain a matter for Member States to decide for themselves’.77
5.2  Market Orientation Models
After adopting the Takeover Directive with the optional board neutrality rule, any 
hope of exhaustive harmonisation lay in how Member States would implement that 
option. When implementing the Directive, some Member States opted out of Arti-
cle 9, pursuant to Article 12, while others opted into Article 9 but implemented the 
reciprocity rule in Article 12(3). These implementing regimes further destroyed 
any glimmer of hope of achieving exhaustive harmonisation of takeover laws in the 
EU. In trying to understand this last blow to any hope of exhaustive harmonisation, 
a normative argument can be made that there is a correlation between a Member 
State’s capital market model and that Member State’s choice of implementation of 
the optional Article 9 of the Takeover Directive. First, it is argued that the board 
neutrality rule is a protection in dispersed share structures rather than in concen-
trated share structures, which may explain the implementation choices. Second, it is 
argued that the UK’s liberal market economy is the basis for why the UK favours the 
board neutrality rule; and third, there is a correlation between a state’s capital mar-
ket model and its choice for Article 9. It is argued that coordinated market econo-
mies are unlikely to favour a board neutrality rule, while liberal market economies 
are likely to do so. In making the argument, the UK and Germany are compared, and 
France is explored.
First, one possible explanation why the UK favours the board neutrality rule 
while Germany does not is that the rule is a protection in dispersed share structures 
in the former and in concentrated share structures in the latter. The regulation of EU 
takeovers is arguably all about protection of shareholders. But the tool, the board 
neutrality rule, which was proposed to protect shareholders, was not favourable to 
all EU share ownership structures. The board neutrality rule neutralises manage-
ment power and empowers shareholders, thus offering protection. In concentrated 
share ownership structures, the block-holding majority is often in a position to influ-
ence management and needs no legal protection against management. In such struc-
tures, the effect of the board neutrality rule is to neutralise not only management 
powers but also the ability of the block-holding majority to influence management. 
In dispersed share ownership structures, shareholders tend to suffer from a lack 
76 Hertig and McCahery (2006), p 119.
77 Scott (2004), p 8.
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of collective ability to influence management and therefore need legal protection 
against management.
In dispersed structures, the effect of the board neutrality rule is to neutralise man-
agement powers whilst empowering shareholders. In dispersed ownership struc-
tures such as the UK, the effect of the board neutrality rule is to empower dispersed 
majority shareholders. In concentrated share ownership structures such as Germany, 
the effect of the board neutrality rule is to constrain concentrated majority share-
holders. In dispersed share ownership structures, the main concern is expropriation 
of the interests of all shareholders by management. In concentrated share ownership 
structures, the main concern is expropriation of the interests of minority sharehold-
ers by management. In the dispersed structures, the board neutrality rule empowers 
all shareholders, while disempowering management. In concentrated structures, the 
board neutrality rule empowers minority shareholders, while disempowering both 
management and majority shareholders. Arguably, harmonising the board neutral-
ity rule with its effect of disempowering concentrated majority shareholders was 
bound to be rejected by economies whose markets have concentrated share owner-
ship structures.
Second, another explanation why the UK favours the board neutrality rule can be 
found when comparing the capital models and their effect on the rule. The capital 
models of the UK and Germany are perhaps best compared in the work of Sigurt 
Vitols, who distinguishes between ‘coordinated market economies’ (CMEs), such as 
Germany, and ‘liberal market economies’ (LMEs), such as the UK.78 Vitols observes 
that, Germany, a CME, has ‘non-market’ institutions, which not only allow for inter-
firm coordination, but also regulate the interaction between shareholders and man-
agers, between employees and firms, and among top managers. Vitols observes that, 
in the UK, an LME, markets play a much more significant role not only in influ-
encing inter-firm relationships but also in regulating interactions between the actors 
mentioned above. In addition, he observes that the UK is characterised by dispersed 
ownership, which is generally solely interested in high return on shares (share value 
maximisation), while Germany is characterised by concentrated ownership with a 
strategic (rather than purely share value maximisation) motivation for ownership 
and with actors pursuing a mix of financial and strategic goals.
Third, another possible explanation is the correlation between capital market 
models and the board neutrality rule. With the capital models of Germany (CME) 
and the UK (LME) in mind, two arguments can be made about the board neutral-
ity rule: first, CMEs are unlikely to favour a board neutrality rule, as managers 
would prefer the ability to take defensive measures to protect employees and other 
stakeholders. Second, LMEs are likely to favour a board neutrality rule, as this may 
discipline managers or facilitate the market for corporate control where dispersed 
shareholders may sell their shares. The manner in which the UK and Germany 
implemented the Takeover Directive simply reflects their LME or CME orientation.
Other takeover regimes, France for example, are not products of an LME or CME 
orientation. Bob Hancké explains the economic model in France as one based on a 
78 Vitols (2001), p 337.
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complex network of elite corporate managers, a configuration that differs from both 
the German associational model and the Anglo-Saxon market model of economic 
coordination.79 These elites are educated at the grandes écoles and then follow a top 
management career path into the state system and the government and then into large 
companies. Hancké explains that the privatisations in the 1980s and 1990s grafted 
themselves upon this elite network and created a protective circle of core sharehold-
ers recruited from the elites, which gave elite managers more autonomy from the 
state while protecting the company against takeovers.80 However, French corporate 
structures are moving toward an LME as the elite networks are disintegrating.
Arguably, the way in which France implemented the Takeover Directive reflects 
its largely elite network orientation. A mutual relationship of respect and trust seems 
to exist between a circle of core shareholders recruited from the elites and the elite 
managers in large companies. In such a mutual relationship, a board neutrality rule 
offers no difficulty to elite managers, nor does opting out pose a threat to elite share-
holders. Thus, in implementing the Takeover Directive, France not only chose to 
opt into Article 9, but also implemented the reciprocity rule in Article 12. Article 
12(3) of the Takeover Directive exempts companies from applying Article 9 if they 
become the subject of an offer launched by a company that does not apply the same 
board neutrality rule. In France, in the case of an offer launched by several offerors, 
the neutrality obligation imposed on the offeree board will lapse if any of the offer-
ors is not subject to a neutrality rule.81 Unlike the choice favourable to either CME 
or LME models, the Article 12(3) reciprocity choice is halfway house (allowing the 
offeree to use defences against the offeror without opting out of Article 9) for an 
elite corporate governance network.
It is accepted that the LME/CME divide in the EU is getting more and more 
blurred, and so this factor may not be impossible to overcome in future EU har-
monisation projects. But for the Takeover Directive, the role of this LME/CME 
divide cannot be ignored. Further, the manner in which the Takeover Directive was 
implemented by some Member States seems to extinguish any glimmer of hope of 
exhaustive harmonisation of EU takeover laws. It also marks the end of history for 
the board neutrality rule in the regulation of EU takeovers. In its report on the imple-
mentation of the Takeover Directive, the Commission found that ‘a large number of 
Member States has shown strong reluctance to lift takeover barriers’.82 Arguably, the 
exhaustive harmonisation of EU takeover laws failed when in the final text of the 
Takeover Directive core provisions such as the board neutrality rule were reduced to 
optional provisions. The Commission seems powerless to reverse the lawful choices 
of Member States that have ‘shown strong reluctance to lift takeover barriers’ by 
opting out of the board neutrality rule. It raises the question: what can the Commis-
sion do?
79 Hancké (2001), p 313.
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6  The Future of EU Takeover Law Harmonisation
6.1  What Can the Commission Do for Takeover Law?
What would be the outcome if the Commission were to start all over again, this time 
with the agenda of reforming EU takeover law and making Article 9 of the Direc-
tive mandatory? It would require deliberately ignoring the LME/CME divide as dis-
cussed above. Removing the optionality of the board neutrality rule and achieving 
a level playing field across the EU is unlikely to happen in the near future, as a 
reform of takeover law remains on hold.83 This is partly due to the shrinking market 
for corporate control in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. In the run-up 
to the adoption of the Takeover Directive 2004/25/EC it was clear that achieving 
a level playing field in the regulation of takeovers in the EU with varying national 
interests required mandatory rather than optional rules. Due to a lack of political 
will, the core provisions of the Takeover Directive, i.e. Articles 9 and 11, were made 
optional, much to the disappointment of the Commission. But recent reports seem 
to suggest that the Commission is holding back and has taken a default position of 
complacence.
In its 2002 report on the Draft Proposal for a Takeover Directive, the Commission 
considered it ‘essential’ to have a ‘European framework for cross-border takeover 
bids’, which, to the Commission, was ‘a key condition for withstanding international 
competition and developing a single capital market’.84 To facilitate ‘international 
competition and develop a single capital market’, on the recommendation of the 
High Level Group of Company Law Experts (2002),85 the Commission sought to 
embed into the Takeover Directive two core provisions—the board neutrality rule 
and the breakthrough rule. Due to disagreement among Member States seeking to 
protect their national interests, these core provisions were made optional for Mem-
ber States in the final version of the Takeover Directive. The Commission was disap-
pointed, as reflected in the statement made by Commissioner Frits Bolkestein, that 
such a Directive without Articles 9 and 11 would not be worth the paper it was writ-
ten on.86
In its 2007 report, the Commission was further disappointed with how the Take- 
over Directive was being implemented. The manner of implementation meant that 
many defences remained in the systems of some Member States. The Commission 
was concerned that ‘these defences may prevent change of control over companies 
or make a takeover more difficult or costly. As a consequence, they entrench man-
agement and/or certain incumbent shareholders and render companies immune to 
unfriendly raiders.’ The Commission found that a number of Member States showed 
83 Mukwiri (2015), pp 186–187.
84 European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
takeover bids’ (Brussels, 2 October 2002), COM(2002) 534 final.
85 European Commission, ‘Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts on Issues Relating 
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‘strong reluctance to lift takeover barriers’ in opting out of core provisions, which 
meant a continued lack of a level playing field and anti-takeover defences.87
In its 2012 report, the Commission seemed to have become somewhat compla-
cent about taking steps to achieve a level playing field. As the Takeover Directive 
was adopted back in 2004 with core provisions made optional under Article 12, one 
remedy lay in revising the Takeover Directive under Article 20. Article 20 requires 
the Commission to assess the working of the Directive and if necessary propose 
revising the Directive 5 years after 20 May 2006. In its 2012 report, the Commis-
sion found that many Member States had opted into Article 9 while few had opted 
into Article 11, but it was convinced that this had not been a major obstacle to take- 
over bids in the EU. With that view, the Commission decided that, ‘in light of this 
and considering also the lack of economic evidence available to justify changing the 
situation, it does not, therefore, seem appropriate at this stage to propose to make the 
optional articles of the Directive mandatory’.88
In its 2013 report on the application of Directive 2004/25/EC on takeover bids, 
the European Parliament endorsed the seemingly complacent approach taken by the 
Commission. It noted that, whilst the majority of Member States had transposed 
Article 9, both pre-bid defences (e.g. pyramid structures or golden shares) and post-
bid defences (e.g. white knight or debt increase) still existed in the Member States. 
The European Parliament took the view that, ‘as the market for corporate control 
has steadily been shrinking during this period of financial crisis, the assessment on 
whether and to what extent further harmonisation measures should be introduced 
with regard to takeover bids would be distorted’. As such, the European Parliament 
recommended that the Commission simply keep monitoring ‘the market for corpo-
rate control and prepare a new assessment on the application of the Directive when 
takeover activities return to a more regular volume’.89
The decision taken by the Commission in its 2012 report and endorsed by the 
European Parliament in its 2013 report seems to be one resulting from complacence. 
But the reality of the matter is that it took over 30  years of political haggling to 
adopt a watered down Takeover Directive with core provisions made optional much 
to the disappointment of the Commission. It would be a big stretch for the Com-
mission to revisit the optional provisions and win back those Member States that in 
30 years could not be persuaded to opt for a mandatory board neutrality rule. Call it 
complacence, but the underlying political history, national interests, and the steadily 
shrinking market for corporate control during the global financial crisis have meant 
that reforming the Takeover Directive to achieve a level playing field has been put 
on hold.
87 European Commission, ‘Report on the implementation of the Directive on Takeover Bids’ (Brussels, 
21 February 2007), SEC(2007) 268, paras 2.1.1 and 3, respectively.
88 European Commission, ‘Application of Directive 2004/25/EC on takeover bids’ (Brussels, 28 June 
2012), COM(2012) 347 final, para. 4.26.
89 European Parliament, ‘Report on Application of Directive 2004/25/EC on takeover bids’ 
(2012/2262(INI)) of 25 March 2013, paras. 23 and 24, respectively.
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6.2  The Future of EU Company Law Harmonisation
Brexit has raised questions about the future of EU company law, especially as the 
Takeover Directive was modelled on UK law and practice. The number of compa-
nies in the 27 EU Member States trading in the UK is reportedly larger than that of 
UK companies trading in the 27 EU Member States, and it is argued that the ‘high 
figures are evidence of the attractivity of UK law due to its greater flexibility, its 
lower minimum capital requirements and the absence of employees’ participation 
on board level’.90 With many companies in the 27 EU Member States trading in the 
UK, Brexit is likely to have an impact on the future of EU company law harmonisa-
tion in general. Gelter and Reif observed that in areas related to capital markets, the 
UK model became the driving force of EU harmonisation from the 2000s onwards; 
in areas such as takeover law and financial reporting, EU law generally adopted UK 
models; and they argue that it is likely that the UK would have had the same impact 
if it had not been an EU member.91 Arguably, the UK is likely to continue influenc-
ing the development of EU company law after Brexit. But the fact that while inside 
the EU the UK’s call for a board neutrality rule was not heard by the majority of the 
EU Member States for over 30 years before the adoption of the Takeover Directive 
and thereafter, suggests that when the UK exits the EU, while outside the EU its 
call for re-introducing a board neutrality rule will not be heard either. One impact of 
Brexit on the future of EU company law harmonisation is that it is likely to mark the 
end of history for the board neutrality rule.
7  Conclusion
This paper has addressed the normative and prescriptive issues that were bound to 
affect and continue to affect harmonisation of takeover laws in the EU. It has exam-
ined varying takeover laws and practices that prevailed in the 1970s when the Com-
mission first began the process of adopting EU law on takeovers, leading up to the 
adoption of the Takeover Directive. It has been argued that these differing prior laws 
and practices had a profound effect on the choices some Member States made, espe-
cially with regard to the optional board neutrality rule.
The paper has also discussed the effect that company law theories, with particular 
focus on manager versus shareholder decision-making primacy, had on the process 
of adopting the Takeover Directive with an optional board neutrality rule. Turn-
ing to prescriptive EU law, it observed that the Directive on takeovers had aimed 
at exhaustive harmonisation, yet the legal basis of the Takeover Directive in Article 
50 TFEU did not envisage even minimum harmonisation. It is no wonder then that 
while the Commission had aimed at exhaustive harmonisation, the Takeover Direc-
tive was adopted as an optional harmonisation instrument.
90 See Hellwig (2017), p 258.
91 Gelter and Reif (2017), p 1416.
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Furthermore, the paper has examined how the manner in which some Member 
States implemented optional provisions further extinguished any glimmer of hope 
for exhaustive harmonisation. This was bound to happen, and the paper has argued 
that the choices made correlated with the different capital models that underpin the 
corporate governance structures of the Member States.
As to what can be done or what else the Commission can do to bring about 
exhaustive harmonisation of EU takeover laws, the paper falls short of simply 
saying: nothing can be done. It is concluded here that as long as there are varied 
national corporate laws, most EU corporate law rules are bound to remain catego-
rised as optional, unimportant, or avoidable.
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